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Writers full of metaphysics-and sometimes void of a sense of poetry--construe Plato's philosophy as an aesthetical ontology in which beauty is made equivalent to goodness and truth. Those who elaborate cognitive theories of art quote his works with approval. Experts in criticism-innocent of the complications of philosophy-say he has no aesthetics at all, that his absorption in moral and mathematical principles renders him blind to poetic truth and lacking in concern with poetry's forms and origins. Others again contend that whatever Plato thinks worthy in the fine arts is either inconsistent with his metaphysics or rendered otiose by considerations of a Divine or Transcendental Beauty subsisting beyond human use and practice.
To give point to certain of these contentions we can do no better than quote a remark or two of F. P. Chambers in his Cycles of Taste. After contrasting what he calls the "anaemic Aristotelianism" of the Middle Ages with "the full-blooded aesthetics which was to mark the Renaissance," Chambers comments, Probably the nearest approach to a doctrine of Beauty in the Middle Ages was the Neo~Platonic treatise of Dionysius the Areopagite, On Divine Names, which achieved so extraordinary a popularity in all the learned circles of Europe. It represented Beauty as one of the Divine names, but ipso facto that Beauty had no more to do with aesthetic Beauty than Plato's idea of moral Beauty aforetime . ... The Middle Ages must be recognized as an era when formal beauty in Fine Art, a self-conscious thought or act, did not exist.
While we are not concerned with the nature of mediaeval aesthetics these remarks will serve to bring into focus two of the main causes from which proceed much of the derogation of Plato's teachings on art and beauty. These are, first, the assumption that Plato's aesthetics is to kalon. This term they will translate by any other word than beauty, which it means, if the alternative may conceivably be put into a place which the original to kalon occupies. For beauty they substitute variouslY the "good," "fitting," "reasonable," "splendid," "worthy," "virtuous," "noble," "adequate," "satisfactory," "valuable," "perfect," or any other term which signifies in a direct or an oblique manner propriety, rectitude, adequacy, validity, moral piety. Having through equivocation stripped Plato's dominant concept of its specific meaning, they place beauty in service to a moral goodness festively arrayed in such aesthetical finery as their ethical tastes will permit. Shying at the word beauty has, of course, more causes than one. The term has been so bandied about in silly compliment and undeserved abuse that its denotations and connotations have become blurred almost beyond recognition. So difficult is it to discover what they are, that not a few critics and aestheticians disdain its use. Things have changed since the days of Socrates when men of vigorous loins and strong stomachs were not averse to discussing in lusty speech the nature and place of beauty and its erotic love. Between their symposia and our modern promotings of beauty, as polish or refinement, circumstances have intervened to dispossess writers of what many still take to be the central concept of aesthetics, the love of beauty. Ironically enough, the reduction of what Plato professes has commonly been initiated under the patronage of his own name. There has been, for instance, the salon where Ie beau, purged of a strength mistaken for dross, has become delicate, and I'amour, having been moved from the diaphragm to the head, has become "platonic" in affront to the name which has provided the adjective. Then has followed the promotion of "spiritual" beauty among "refined" persons, without intelligent or intelligible commerce, intercourse, or communion with the object of their affections. Some people entertain the impression that this is an enlightened religion. In "realistic" protest, psychologists have reduced love to an animal phenomenon and beauty to an epiphenomenon-phenomenon's shadow. Then, of course, there have been the noctes of bohemians, made memorable by memoirs in protest against philistinism. These have appeared nocuous to those aestheticians who profess a whole and steady view of life. Not to be overlooked are the theatreslecture halls and class-rooms-of the moralistic operators who all too often with clumsy implements crush the sinews of beauty's wings lest she escape their categories, outrun their areas, and take to soaring in wanton ways.
Whatever the results of such carryings-on, the fact remains that the he observes, are not only full of motions but also capable of awareness of that order in motion which is rhythm. The patterns of music, in texts, modes, and rhythms, entering deeply into the sources of human action, elicit ordered responses. In this way discipline and instruciion become manners of behaviour and belief in the young; "belieP' because the poets are not scientists, and their "wisdom" is not presented as a system of logically co-ordinated propositions. Plato provides no satisfactory explanation of the source of poetic creation. He rejects a current view that poets are artists in the technical sense. It is his opinion that in their seeing and saying they soar above what can be taught by rule. Also their casting of lasting spells over their audiences evidences something more than an empirically acquired knack. Poetry remains a gift from the gods. The choral ritual from which it springs is shared by gods and men. Both are dancers. In poetry's composing and reciting there is something comparable to a magnetic communication by the muses to the poet and through him to rhapsode and audience in tum.
Because of the ready response which music evokes and the potency of its spell, Plato rejects instrumental multiplicities and modal mixtures, as well as textual and other representations which lack congruity in inner sequence-when, for instance, unmanly fear is displayed by poetic heroes, and intemperance, variability, and cruelty characterize poetic gods. Instrumental multiplicity and caprice do not instil order, nor does inconsequence lay a foundation for the reasoning which is to come later. Musical pieces in which these deficiencies appear lack internal "measure" and therefore fail to meet the requirements imposed by beauty. So far as education is concerned, considerations of beauty are to be decisive in estimating the manner of poetic saying as well as the matter of its communication. Virtue is to be taught in the most beautifnl way in every regard. Is there, Plato asks, a more lovable thing to behold than-the harmonious union of a beautiful disposition of soul with an outward form which manifests the stamp of beauty? An examination of music, he reflects in the Republic, no doubt with his Symposium in mind, should begin and end with the love of the beautiful.
Beauty is the recurrent theme which underlies every elaboration of Plato's thinking throughout the complexities of knowledge, desire, and virtue. Having turned from a discussion of music to list in illustration other sorts of thing, architecture, weaving, embroidery, plants, and persons, which elicit responses from the young, he makes the stipulation that the educator is to rely on such craftsmen as are able to trace out, with the of which remain through recurring impressions on the senses from objects which appear, change, and come and go but will see, continues beyond generation and When recognized as which underlie these universals are to be confused with modem things which bear the ancient Greek ; when regarded as which enter into a commensurate scheme of without reference to particulars, they are called Forms. Knowledge, as distinct from with the particulars to courage, temperance, the it continues in the oq~an:IZlfLg of these into a sylJ[1m,eln~cal scheme of life under dominance. Beauty as the object both of wisdom and of desire imposes on her pursuer an arduous less than the ascent of a difficult scale of perception and an upward journey made hazardous by.a headsteed. Plato exposes this scale of drawing a distinction between many beautifuls and many goods on the one hand and the Forms of beauty and goodness on the other. The fonner, he says, lie in the of the latter in
In of the types of encountered in these two 'l"P{l"/"'IT'~ he takes a line and divides it into two parts he again divides into two four seg;me~ntS in all. To the two that are lower he assigns opinion and, to the upper two knowledge. The lowest of the Del~cet)tlOln of "images," such as on surfaces and smooth water. In the next seg .. the second of is to be the in "faith" unto use of particular things whose natures are not as yet discerned in third "segment of the divided line represents the perception of meanings, the seeing through particulars to underlying universals, hypotheses. For example, in the science of geometry the particular triangle or square drawn on a flat surface is perceived as an example of triangularity or squareness, even indeed if the particular available to sense is not made with full accuracy according to definition. In the fourth stage of perception, the last segment of the line, the universals are cognized as Forms, as intelligibles without reference to any specific particulars, as the constituents of a commensurate scheme. This scheme is perceived by dialectic. With the recognition of hypotheses the percipient passes from the difluse and undefined multiplicity of sense-impressions to an area of definable entities; through his dialectical knowledge of Forms he enters a realm of unity within a variety of intelligibles--one of symmetry or beauty. Beyond the realm of dialectic, according to Plato's statement in the Republic, stands the Form of the good, the cause of both being and being known. Of the nature of this Form as cause Plato gives but little account. He says in the Republic that it partakes of beauty in superlative degree and is knowable not directly but by analogy (analogia). In a later dialogue, the Philebus, the good is said to take refuge in the region of beauty. Perception at every stage has its objective counterpart; as activity it is the correlative functioning of a faculty or power in the subject with an appropriate object; always "like knows like." The objective correlate of sense consists of "images"; of "faith" in use, particulars; of the agent of perception which discerns meanings, hypotheses; of dialectical knowing, Forms. To the causal Form of the good no specific correlative faculty in the subject is assigned. It can be known only by analogy.
Considerations of poetry and complementary means to early education have led to the dividing of perception into four parts. To which of these four, then, is poetry to be assigned? Plato answers, to the lowest, that of "images." What the poet communicates cannot be employed as particular matters of fact. One cannot rest one's body on a poetic bed, nor defend oneself against an assailant with a poetic spear. Unlike the scientist, the poet does not present logically defined universals, nor does he, like the dialectician, undertake to organize Forms in a logically commensurate scheme. His compositions present imitative "images." Such permanence as he gives to fleeting objects is mimetic depiction. Even as particulars are "imitations" of Forms, so is poetry an "imitation" of particulars which too lie within the region of opinion.
In this manner Plato provides an epistemological resolution of the and the mathe:maltic:al c."I-'~,,,,,,,,,, he als'o finds in number the clue to that measure which not links sensibility with intelligibility but dominates every beautiful action and product from poetry, through the crafts, arts, and sciences, to the virtuous life and the composition of the cosmos. At the end of his search he identifies beauty, the reality which confers more benefits on man than aught else, with measure and "commeasure" (or symmetry).
Plato has recognized an ancient quarrel between the poets and the philosophers, but he entertains no conflict either between beauty and truth or between beauty and virtue. The virtuous man for him is the effective lover of truth and of beauty as well. The motivation of the soul is amorous. To the depiction of amorous desire Plato devotes two dialogues, the Symposium and the Phaedrus. The concept he employs in describing this is eros (the Latin amor), and not philia (the Latin amicitia and the English "friendship").
In the Symposium Eros is described as a daemon, not a god and yet not a mere mortal but a spirit intermediate between the two. The human soul whose desire he represents has the possibility of sharing in a divine life. Eros is said to be the offspring of Penury and Resource. Like his mother he is in a state of privation and as the son of his father he is eager and enterprising. The erotic lover in the very act of desire has begun to overcome the disparity between what he is and what he may be. The objective of Eros is the possession of the beautiful: all men have love for what is beautiful in some degree; they think beautiful what they love-this can be a beautiful soul within a less well favoured body. Desire is not merely a condition of emptiness or of unrest but includes the recognition of something desired. The perceived and loved evoke latent capacities in the perceiver and lover. Love includes the yearning for begetting and perpetuation. The impulse to produce permanent things and thus to achieve a kind of deathlessness is everywhere manifest among organisms. Animals have young and men leave after them the progeny of poems, laws, and political institutions. Hnman love is a quest. It begins with an affection for one beautiful body and then passes into a search for physical beauty as such. After this follows susceptiveness in the presence of beautiful souls, thoughts, institutions, and laws, and the intimacy of the contemplation of a great ocean of beautiful things. Then suddenly, as in an initiation into a mystery, comes the perception of beauty itself, absolute, timeless, selfsame, perfect. Through the espousal of and identification with this beauty, which exists beyond change and decay, the human seeker possesses in issue such immortality as he may attain. Whereas in the Republic the good is left as a lonely object without a specific correlative subject, something to be known indirectly through analogy, in the Symposium beauty's pursuer and his beloved are said to be one in marital intimacy.
The Symposium treats love as erotic impulse; the Phaedrus depicts it as a kind of inspired madness. The mad lover, like Eros, is in a state of unrest and yearning for the satisfaction of his desire. His condition is one of struggle, for not all the parts of his nature are on easy terms with the others. When his reason discerns what is really beautiful and desires its pursuit an unruly wanton part seeks intercourse with its own kind. To speak in a figure, each soul contains a charioteer (reason) and two winged steeds. In human souls one of the horses (the spirited element) is responsive to direction, the other (appetite) is a headstrong and fractious fellow. The gods, who also have souls, are subject to no internal conflict; their charioteers and horses are one in purpose. Together they compose a choral procession to which any soul is welcome, for there is no jealousy among members of the divine choir. The gods in festal procession ascend with ease in order and strength to the apex of the vault of heaven; reaching its outer periphery they behold things unavailable to sense and opinion, things of which no poet has ever sung, the Forms themselves. These are the appropriate objects of their cognition and the proper nurture of their intelligences.
Human souls find their going difficult. Those of their number whose charioteers control their steeds most capably soar above the domain of opinion and, before returning, catch glimpses of the things which lie beyond. The others, either through the failure of the charioteers or the unruliness of headstrong, plunging steeds, manage in confusion and great disorder to reach far lesser heights, and then fall back with wings severely broken in the meltie. No further attempt at an ascent can be made until new wings are grown, for it is the function of their wings to carry souls aloft. Souls which have seen most on their journey become true lovers, philosophers, that is, lovers of wisdom, lovers of beauty, truly "musical" persons. Strictly speaking no soul which has failed to see something of Forms can appear in human shape, because it is distinctive of man to perceive the manifold particulars of sense as examples of one intelligible. Knowledge, in accordance with our "myth," may be regarded as the recollection of what the soul has already seen of real being. It is this recognition which nourishes the human soul and makes its wings to grow. The soul which has become a philosopher is enabled to soar in erotic madness or inspiration and join in the life of the gods so far as humans may. To the elevation of souls beauty of all the Forms contributes most. It reveals itself most strikingly through impressions on the senses and while the most readily discernible of all realities is also the most lovable.
Several topics remain for consideration, measure, pleasure, the raising of aesthetic practice to spontaneous play, mimesis as imitation, as well as the question whether Plato in his later dialogues, when he discusses the nature and place of measure, discards in part at least the earlier epistemological scheme of the Republic. Space permits only a summary account of measure.
Measure, according to Plato, is that human acquisition which has rendered the sciences exact; increased the effectiveness of the arts and crafts; brought within explanation language, music, definition, health, and virtue; made intelligible the structure of the cosmos; and given beauty its supremacy over all valuable things. Those who talk cleverly about measurement, says Plato, fail to distinguish two sorts, one extrinsic and the other intrinsic to the object under view. In the former, calculation proceeds according to relative lengths, breadths, velocities, and the like; in the latter, according to the mean, the fitting, the right proportion, what is proper in circumstance. The second sort may be regarded as the result of introducing "limit" into what would otherwise be "infinite" or indeterminate. Take the case of "sound" : this by itself is meaningless-less than noise, which has some degree of determinate character-until there is brought into it the "limit" of vowel, consonant, syllable, word, and so on, when it becomes verbally significant; or again, until there is brought into it mode, tone, interval, and rhythm, when it acquires musical meaning. The same holds true of space which becomes specific in character through the introduction of line, angle, and triangle. Meaning and significance-----order and design as wellwherever found, are the results of definition, that is, of the introduction of the "finite," literally, into what would otherwise be a meaningless "infinite" in multiplicity or extent. In this procedure four "concauses" are involved, the "infinite" (or limitless, indefinite, undefined), the "finite" (or limit), the "mixture" of the two, and reaSOD. Definition, the agent of measure, is to be found everywhere. Oral and written speech, the fitting word, the proper pitch, and the inevitable rhythm are the results of bringing internal measure into sound. The physical cosmos, according to some thinkers at least, came into existence through the merging of determining geometric patterns with indeterminate matter. In medicine the practitioner's concern is with the restoring of measured balance or proper mean to disproportionate activities of parts or elements within the body. The task of the educator
